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Executive Summary
In recent years, municipalities throughout California have struggled to meet housing needs, 
and construction of new housing units in the state has not kept apace of demand, resulting in 
increased housing costs that rank among the highest in the nation. At the same time, California 
faces pressure to achieve ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals in the relatively near 
term. Meeting those goals will require significant decreases in transportation sector emissions, 
which represent about 40 percent of the state’s GHG emissions. Particularly impacted by both 
the affordability and climate change crises are low-income Californians, whose communities 
suffer disproportionate impacts from lack of housing availability and vulnerability to climate 
change—and who also are California’s most reliable transit riders. 
Lawmakers seeking to tackle both housing and greenhouse gas reduction goals have 
turned to transit-oriented development programs—zoning programs that promote increased 
housing density close to mass transit options like bus and rail—as one way to address both 
issues. This paper focuses on one such transit-oriented development program, the City of Los 
Angeles’ Transit Oriented Communities Affordable Housing Incentive Program (TOC Program). 
The TOC Program offers density and other development incentives to projects within a half-mile 
radius of major transit stops, in exchange for developer commitments to provide a set percent-
age of deed-restricted affordable housing units within those projects. 
The TOC Program has been a major driver of affordable housing production in the City of 
Los Angeles since its adoption in late 2017, but certain structural and legal constraints may 
be impeding its full capacity to augment affordable housing supply. This paper explores those 
potential constraints and offers recommendations to increase the program’s efficacy. It also 
explores how the program can provide data and lessons learned to lawmakers considering 
similar inclusionary transit-oriented development programs within their jurisdictions, or even 
at the state level.
Los Angeles’s Transit-Oriented  
Communites Program:  
Challenges and Opportunities
By Julia E. Stein 
 WWW.LAW.UCLA.EDU/EMMETT PRITZKER BRIEF NO. 13 | NOVEMBER 20192
EMMETT INSTITUTE ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
To that end, this paper’s recommendations include:
n  Alterations to the TOC Program itself to address existing structural and legal hurdles to its 
full implementation, including through better interagency coordination, adoption of a pilot 
program to test limited streamlining efforts, and expansions of its applicability;
n  Better data collection and analysis to assess the program’s performance to date, including 
data regarding discretionary and non-discretionary program applications, legal challenges 
to applicant projects, neighborhood patterns and demographics in program incentive 
areas, and trends in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and transit ridership among applicant 
project occupants; and
n  Lawmaker attention to lessons learned from TOC Program implementation, including stake-
holder experiences, the relationship of the discretionary approval process to the program’s 
efficacy, financial constraints impacting developer utilization of the program, and a critical 
review of affordability designations and requirements associated with the program. 
Introduction
In recent years, California has found itself at the epicenter of a nationwide housing afford-
ability crisis.1 The median price of a home in California rose to $570,000 in 2018, up 6 percent 
from the prior year, and more than 2.5 times higher than the median home price nationwide.2 
Los Angeles is the third most rent-burdened metropolitan area in the country and ranks second 
in the country for the percentage of severely rent-burdened residents, defined as residents who 
spend 50 percent or more of their income on rent.3 Earlier this year, Governor Newsom called 
for the state to add 3.5 million new homes by 2025. The Governor has proposed a $1.75 billion 
housing package to attempt to meet that goal, but at the current pace of construction, the state 
is on track to reach only half that number.4 Low-income residents are most impacted: housing 
for households that earn less than 50 percent of the area median income (AMI) in their region is 
at a 1.5 million unit deficit.5
1 Only about 30 percent of Californians could afford to purchase a median-priced home in the first quarter of 2019. Cali-
fornia assoCiation of realtors, Housing Affordability Index – Traditional, available at https://www.car.org/marketdata/data/
haitraditional Jul. 8, 2019). At the beginning of 2019, California was home to 17 of the country’s 25 least affordable housing 
markets. Michael B. Sauter, Usa today, America’s 25 least affordable housing markets: California home to 17 of them, avail-
able at https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/06/20/americas-25-least-affordable-housing-markets/39579711/ 
(Jun. 20, 2019).
2 See California assoCiation of realtors, Housing Market Forecast (Oct. 11, 2018), available at https://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/car-releases-its-2019-california-housing-market-forecast-300729605.html; Matt Levin, et al., CalMatters, 
Californians: Here’s why your housing costs are so high (Aug. 21, 2017), available at https://calmatters.org/explainers/
housing-costs-high-california/.
3 See freddieMaC MUltifaMily, Rental Burden by Metro (Apr. 2019), available at https://mf.freddiemac.com/docs/rental_burden_
by_metro.pdf.
4 See California offiCe of the Governor, Governor Newsom Announces Legislative Proposals to Confront the Housing Cost 
Crisis (Mar. 11, 2019), available at https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/03/11/governor-newsom-announces-legislative-pro-
posals-to-confront-the-housing-cost-crisis/; Michael Hiltzik, los anGeles tiMes, California’s housing crisis reaches from the 
homeless to the middle class—but it’s still almost impossible to fix (Mar. 29, 2018), available at https://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-housing-crisis-20180330-story.html.
5 Hiltzik, supra note 4. While many argue that the methodology for calculating the extent of the housing deficit itself requires 
improvement, it is clear that there is a dearth of housing available in the state. See, e.g., Paavo Monkonnen, et al., UCla lewis 
Center, Issue Brief, A Flawed Law: Reforming California’s Housing Element (2019) at 2-3, available at https://www.lewis.ucla.
edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/2019/05/2019_RHNA_Monkkonen-Manville-Friedman_FF.pdf. 
Los Angeles is the third 
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Lawmakers have pushed through a bevy of new measures aimed to address the problem. 
During the past two legislative sessions, the California Legislature passed, and the Governor 
signed into law, a total of 31 housing-related bills, and 13 more were introduced during this 
session.6 On the regional and local level, cities and counties have also been exploring options 
to ease the housing shortage. This summer, San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors unanimously 
voted to place a $600 million bond measure on the November ballot that would support the 
building or rehabilitation of more than 2,000 affordable housing units, with support from other 
San Francisco politicians, construction unions, and nonprofit developers.7 And in addition to 
the ordinance that is the subject of this paper, the City of Los Angeles has been moving forward 
with a long-term effort to establish Transit Neighborhood Plans focused on land use planning 
near four Metro rail lines, with a goal of enhancing transit ridership in part through siting devel-
opment of new housing close to mass transit.8
One tool under consideration at both the state and local levels has been the concept of 
upzoning—or allowing for more dense development—near existing mass transit, such as rail 
stations or bus lines with frequent service. In theory, this type of development, known as “tran-
sit-oriented development,” would result in infill development that produces additional housing 
units in areas where residents will need to be less reliant on cars for transportation. Proponents 
of transit-oriented development argue that it serves both housing and environmental goals. 
Densifying in select areas allows for more residential units than would otherwise be permitted, 
and those units are situated in already-developed areas. This avoids the environmental impacts 
6 California departMent of hoUsinG and CoMMUnity developMent, California Housing Package Launched January 1 with a Resolution 
to Ease Housing Costs, Shortage (Jan. 3, 2018), available at http://www.hcd.ca.gov/about/newsroom/docs/2018-CA-Hous-
ing-Package.pdf; Central City assoCiation of los anGeles, Summary of California Housing Bills (Mar. 2019), available at https://
www.ccala.org/clientuploads/comms/2019/2019_Housing_Bills_Summary_v2.pdf.
7 Joshua Sabatini, san franCisCo exaMiners, SF places $600M bond on November ballot to address 
affordable housing crisis (Jul. 9, 2019), available at https://www.sfexaminer.com/the-city/
sf-places-600m-bond-on-november-ballot-to-address-affordable-housing-crisis/.
8 City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Los Angeles Transit Neighborhood Plans: About the Project, available at https://
www.latnp.org/.
In theory, “transit-
oriented development” 
would result in infill 
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produces additional 
housing units in areas 
where residents will 
need to be less reliant on 
cars for transportation.
Apartment construction in Hollywood, CA
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of building on undeveloped land in the suburbs or exurbs, including greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from increases in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) to get to and from home, as well as 
species, air quality, and other impacts associated with “greenfields” development.9 
Indeed, climate change-related goals are a topic of significant concern at the state level 
as well. California has adopted the most ambitious GHG emission reduction policies in the 
country, with laws mandating reductions to 40 percent below 1990 emission levels by the year 
2030 and 100 percent use of net-zero electricity by 2045.10 Transportation plays a key role in the 
state’s ability to meet emission reduction targets, because emissions from the transportation 
sector represent nearly 40 percent of California’s total GHG emissions.11 In discussing methods 
to reduce transportation sector emissions, lawmakers and regulators have increasingly empha-
sized the need to consider modifying land use patterns that contribute to increased VMT, and 
thereby, increased GHG emissions.12 Transit-oriented development is one way to achieve more 
climate-friendly land use patterns.
But transit-oriented development is not necessarily a silver bullet. Some housing advocates 
express concerns that as rents rise due to an influx of market-rate transit-oriented housing, 
low-income residents in infill areas—often communities of color—will be displaced to subur-
ban and exurban areas far from their jobs and current neighborhoods.13 Such a displacement 
9 See, e.g., U.s. environMental proteCtion aGenCy, Encouraging Transit Oriented Development; Case Studies that Work (May 2014), 
available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/documents/phoenix-sgia-case-studies.pdf; Joel Epstein, 
streetsBloG la, Los Angeles and the Case for Transit-Oriented Development (May 23, 2012), available at https://la.streets-
blog.org/2012/05/23/los-angeles-and-the-case-for-transit-oriented-development-part-1-of-3/.
10 Sen. Bill 32, 2016 Reg. Sess., Ch. 249, 2016 Cal. Stat.; Sen. Bill 100, 2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 312, 2018 Cal. Stat.; California air 
resoUrCes Board, California’s Climate Change Scoping Plan (Scoping Plan) (Nov. 2017) at ES1, available at https://ww3.arb.
ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf; Alexei Koseff, the saCraMento Bee, California approves goal for 100% car-
bon-free electricity by 2045 (Sept. 10, 2018), available at https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/
article218128485.html.
11 Scoping Plan, supra note 10.
12 Id. at ES5-6.
13 See, e.g., allianCe for CoMMUnity transit—los anGeles, Transit for All: Achieving Equity in Transit-Oriented Development at 3, avail-
able at http://www.allianceforcommunitytransit.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ACT-LA-Transit-for-All-Achieving-Equi-
ty-in-Transit-Oriented-Development.pdf.
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pattern would be concerning: these communities are at the highest risk of the housing insecu-
rity the state is attempting to tackle, and also represent the state’s most reliable transit ridership 
base.14 And some proponents of transit-oriented development also urge streamlining under 
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), a public disclosure and mitigation statute that 
environmental justice communities—low-income communities of color that are overburdened 
by pollution and other environmental harms—have historically used to protect themselves in 
the face of unwanted development. CEQA streamlining, if not thoughtful, could have serious 
unintended consequences for these communities.
Against this backdrop, this paper will explore one effort to boost transit-oriented develop-
ment: the City of Los Angeles’s Transit Oriented Communities Ordinance (hereinafter referred to 
as the TOC Program).15 Adopted about two years ago, the TOC Program is an upzoning measure 
that allows for increased density in projects built close to mass transit, provided that the project 
developer agrees to include a set percentage of deed-restricted affordable housing as part of 
the project and replace any existing affordable or rent stabilized units.16 The density increase 
provided by the TOC Program is reflected in a boost to two different density-related metrics 
employed by Los Angeles’ zoning code: (1) the number of units that may be sited on a property; 
and (2) the floor-area ratio (FAR) of the property, which reflects a building’s or buildings’ total 
floor area in relation to the size of the lot upon which the building or buildings are constructed. 
Unit count increases allow for additional residential construction beyond what would otherwise 
be permitted, while FAR increases can impact both the size and number of residential units and 
the type of commercial space that can be built in a mixed-use project.17 The program also pro-
vides additional menu incentives that can increase building envelope beyond FAR and number 
of units, including height increases and reductions in yard and setback requirements. 
In other words, the TOC Program allows for certain projects to increase both the number of 
residential units in a building and the building’s footprint beyond that which would be permit-
ted by-right by the project site’s zoning, as long as developers agree to build a set percentage 
of deed-restricted affordable housing. As discussed below, the TOC Program also offers another 
transit-oriented incentive by right if the conditions of the program are met: a reduction in the 
amount of required parking for a project. 
This paper aims to assess how the TOC Program is working, challenges to the TOC Program’s 
implementation, and some potential implications of a wider-scale adoption of TOC-like mea-
The TOC Program allows 
for certain projects 
to increase both the 
number of residential 
units in a building and 
the building’s footprint 
beyond that which 
would be permitted 
by-right, as long as 
developers agree to 
build a set percentage 
of deed-restricted 
affordable housing.
14 Michael Manville, et al., Falling Transit Ridership: California and Southern California (Jan. 2018) at 5, available at https://www.
its.ucla.edu/2018/01/31/new-report-its-scholars-on-the-cause-of-californias-falling-transit-ridership/
15 Los Angeles Municipal Code (L.A.M.C.) 12.22. A.31; see also City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Transit Oriented 
Communities Affordable Housing Incentive Program Guidelines (TOC Program Guidelines) (revised Feb. 26, 2018), available at 
https://planning.lacity.org/ordinances/docs/toc/TOCGuidelines.pdf.
16 Inclusionary housing programs like the TOC Program are one way of addressing the need for deed-restricted affordable 
housing but have the effect of placing the responsibility to build such housing on private developers, who are beholden 
to investors. Due to financial constraints private developers face, in some cases, the requirements of inclusionary housing 
programs can result in reduced production of affordable housing. See David Garcia, terner Center for hoUsinG innovation, 
University of California Berkeley, Making It Pencil: The Math Behind Housing Development (Aug. 2019) at 1, available at http://
ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/Making_It_Pencil_The_Math_Behind_Housing_Development.pdf. There are other 
alternatives to augmenting affordable housing production—for example, applying increased property taxes to landowners 
and utilizing the revenue to build government-subsidized housing—which, some argue, would more properly align costs 
and responsibilities of providing affordable housing. This paper does not address the relative merits of increasing property 
taxes (an exercise which is politically challenging) as contrasted with inclusionary housing programs. Instead, recognizing 
that inclusionary housing programs are used as a tool to increase affordable housing stock, this paper assesses possible 
improvements to such programs through the lens of the TOC Program.
17 While the TOC Program Guidelines restrict project developers from applying FAR increases to uses other than residential, 
the bonus residential FAR can mean that a project can become a draw for certain types of commercial tenants; in some 
cases this can impact project financials, making it easier to offset the costs of providing additional affordable housing units, 
and allowing developers to add neighborhood amenities that will support residential uses.
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sures. As similar proposals are considered on the state level—through legislation like SB 50 and 
its predecessor, SB 827—and by other local jurisdictions, it is important to take stock of lessons 
learned through Los Angeles’s experiences.  
At the outset of this assessment, it is important to note that while implementation of the 
TOC Program has led to the production of both market-rate housing units and deed-restricted 
affordable housing units, this paper will focus primarily on TOC’s efficacy at producing affordable 
housing units. An ongoing debate rages in California (and nationally) about the extent to which 
production of market-rate housing alone contributes to the alleviation of the housing shortage. 
This paper does not seek to answer that question, but instead focuses on the ways that the TOC 
Program, and potential future programs like it, could enhance production of deed-restricted 
affordable housing units more likely to relieve housing pressure for low-income Californians 
while simultaneously providing a GHG emission reduction benefit.  
This paper will proceed in four additional parts: first, it will explain the mechanics of the TOC 
Program; next, it will offer an assessment of the TOC Program’s efficacy to date and hurdles18 
curbing a more robust implementation of the program; then, it will discuss the potential impli-
cations of a TOC-like program writ large; and finally, it will summarize recommendations and 
concluding thoughts.
What is the Transit-Oriented  
Communities Program?
In November 2016, Los Angeles voters approved Measure JJJ, a ballot initiative intended 
to promote the development of affordable housing stock, by an overwhelming 64 percent of 
the vote. Measure JJJ codified a requirement that projects seeking general plan amendments 
or certain zone changes both include a set percentage of affordable housing or pay a fee 
to an affordable housing trust fund, and meet prevailing wage and labor standards in their 
construction. Separately, the measure also required the City to create an affordable housing 
incentive program for developments located near major transit stops.   
Pursuant to Measure JJJ’s mandate, the City’s TOC Program Guidelines, effective Septem-
ber 22, 2017, created new obligations and a new incentives system for residential and mixed-
use projects located within a half-mile radius of a major transit stop (defined as a rail station or 
the intersection of at least two bus routes with frequent service during peak commute times). 
Projects qualify for the program only if they meet certain affordable housing requirements. 
Developments that seek to take advantage of the TOC Program are required to provide a set 
percentage of Extremely Low Income (ELI) (defined as households earning 30 percent of AMI), 
Very Low Income (VLI) (defined as earning 50 percent AMI), and Lower Income (LI) (defined as 
earning 80 percent AMI) units based on their proximity to particular types of transit.19 The TOC 
Program is unique among density bonus programs in its provision of incentives specifically 
18 This paper will primarily focus on legal hurdles baked into the structure of the existing TOC Program or resulting from its 
interface with already existing zoning and land use approval regimes in the City of Los Angeles. There are other limitations 
on TOC Program implementation that are economics-driven—for example, materials costs for high-rise buildings—but this 
paper will not concentrate on those.
19 TOC Program Guidelines, supra note 15, at 7.
As similar proposals 
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state level and by other 
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for ELI units. For example, California’s Density Bonus Law, more typical of these programs, 
provides incentives starting at the VLI level and ranges up to the moderate income (MI) level. 
The TOC Program is therefore specially positioned to create dedicated housing for the ELI 
segment of the population. That has borne out as the TOC Program has been implemented, 
with ELI units representing a significant portion of those proposed in program applications. 
The TOC Program Guidelines establish four tiers of major transit stops. Higher tiers provide 
nearer access to high-quality transit, and therefore receive the greatest incentives under the 
program. A project’s tier is based on the shortest distance between its lot and a qualified 
transit stop, as well as the type of stop the lot is proximate to, as follows20: 
20 Id. at 5.
21 Regular buses are non-rapid buses with service at intervals of at least an average of 15 minutes during peak hours.
22 A rapid bus line is higher quality service bus line with attributes that can include dedicated bus lanes, branded vehicles/
stations, high frequency service intervals, limited stops at major intersections, intelligent transportation systems, possible 
off-board fare collection, and/or all door boarding. Rapid buses include the Metro Rapid 700 lines, the Metro Orange and 
Silver Lines, the Big Blue Rapid lines, and the Metro Bus Rapid Transit lines, among others.
The TOC Program 
Guidelines establish 
four tiers of major 
transit stops. Higher 
tiers provide nearer 
access to high quality 
transit, and therefore 
receive the greatest 
incentives under the 
program.
TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3  TIER 4 
750-2640 feet from 
the intersection 
of two regular bus 
lines21  
0-749 feet from the 
intersection of two 
regular bus lines 
(non-rapid buses 
with service at 15 
min. intervals during 
peak hours) 
0-749 feet from the 
intersection of a 
regular bus line and 
a rapid bus line 
0-749 feet from a 
Metro rail station 
that intersects with 
another rail line or a 
rapid bus
1500-2640 feet from 
the intersection of a 
regular bus line and 
a rapid bus line22  
750-1499 feet from 
the intersection of a 
regular bus line and 
a rapid bus line 
0-1499 feet from the 
intersection of two 
rapid bus lines 
1500-2640 feet 
from a Metrolink rail 
station 
1500-2640 feet from 
the intersection 
of two rapid bus 
lines 
0-749 feet from a 
Metrolink rail station
 
750-1499 feet from 
a Metrolink rail 
station 
0-2640 feet from a 
Metro rail station
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Base incentives—a density bonus, a FAR bonus, and relaxed parking requirements—are 
available by tier to projects that meet the percentage affordable housing requirements (cal-
culated using the project’s total number of units) set by the TOC Guidelines, as follows23:
23 TOC Program Guidelines, supra note 15, at 9-11.
24 There are some exceptions: in the RD Zone or a specific plan or overlay district that regulates residential FAR, the maximum 
FAR increase is 45 percent; if allowable base FAR is less than 1.25:1 then the maximum FAR is 2.75:1; in the Greater Down-
town Housing Incentive Area, the FAR increase is limited to 40 percent. See id. 
Min. % 
On-Site 
Restricted 
Affordable 
Units
8% ELI, 11% 
VLI, or 20% LI
9% ELI, 12% 
VLI, or 21% LI
10% ELI, 14% 
VLI, or 23% LI
11% ELI, 15% 
VLI, or 25% LI
TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3 TIER 4
Max. % 
Increase to 
No. of  
Dwelling 
Units
50% unless 
RD Zone,  
then 35%
60% unless 
RD Zone,  
then 35% 
70% unless 
RD Zone,  
then 40% 
80% unless 
RD Zone,  
then 45% 
FAR24 Greater of 
up to 40% 
increase or 
2.75:1 in  
commercial 
zones
Greater of 
up to 45% 
increase or 
3.25:1 in  
commercial 
zones 
Greater of 
up to 50% 
increase or 
3.75:1 in  
commercial 
zones 
Greater of 
up to 55% 
increase or 
4.25:1 in  
commercial 
zones 
Residential 
Parking
No more than 
0.5 spaces/
bedroom 
required
No more than 
0.5 spaces/
bedroom or  
1 space/ 
residential 
unit required 
No more than 
0.5 spaces/
residential 
unit required
No required 
parking for 
residential 
units
Non- 
Residential 
Parking (for 
Mixed-Use 
projects)
Up to 10% 
reduction  
in non- 
residential 
parking 
requirement
Up to 20% 
reduction  
in non- 
residential 
parking 
requirement
Up to 30% 
reduction  
in non- 
residential 
parking 
requirement
Up to 40% 
reduction  
in non- 
residential 
parking 
requirement
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25  Id. at 8-9.
All-affordable projects—projects comprised of 100 percent affordable housing—can “tier 
up” under the program, allowing them to seek the bonuses that would normally be applicable 
to projects in the next tier. This mechanism provides an added incentive to drive production of 
affordable housing units. In addition to base incentives, projects may be granted up to three 
additional incentives in return for meeting specific affordability requirements25:
n  To receive one additional menu incentive, the percentage of on-site restricted affordable 
housing units must be at least 4 percent ELI, 5 percent VLI, 10 percent LI, or 10 percent MI in 
a common interest development, based on the project’s base units.
n  To receive two additional menu incentives, the percentage of on-site restricted affordable 
housing units must be at least 7 percent ELI, 10 percent VLI, 20 percent LI, or 20 percent MI in 
a common interest development, based on the project’s base units.
n  To receive three additional menu incentives, the percentage of on-site restricted affordable 
housing units must be at least 11 percent ELI, 15 percent VLI, 30 percent LI, or 30 percent MI 
in a common interest development, based on the project’s base units.
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Additional menu incentives include, by tier26:
26 Id. at 11-14.
27 Front yard reductions are limited to no more than the average of the front yards of adjoining buildings on the same front-
age; if there are no adjoining buildings, no reduction is permitted. Yard reductions may not be applied along any property 
line that abuts a R1 or more restrictive residential zoned property. Id. at 12.
28 Projects located on lots with a 45-foot or less height limit or in a Specific Plan area or overlay district that regulates height 
will require any height increases over 11 feet to be stepped-back at least 15 feet from the exterior face of the ground floor 
of the building located along any street frontage. Id. at 13.
29 Measurements are taken from the property line of the adjoining lot. Id. 
All-affordable projects 
can “tier up” under 
the program, allowing 
them to seek bonuses 
that would normally be 
applicable to projects in 
the next tier. 
Comm. 
Setback
Any yard req’t 
for the RAS3 
Zone
Same as  
Tier 1
Same as  
Tier 1
Same as  
Tier 1
TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3 TIER 4
Residential 
Setback
Decrease27
Up to 25% 
in width or 
depth of 
one yard or 
setback  
Up to 30% 
in width or 
depth of 
one yard or 
setback
Same as  
Tier 2
Up to 35% 
in width or 
depth of 
one yard or 
setback
Open Space
Decrease
Up to 20% Same as  
Tier 1
Up to 25% Same as  
Tier 3
Lot  
Coverage 
Increase
Up to 25% Same as 
Tier 1
Up to 35% Same as  
Tier 3
Lot Width 
Decrease 
Up to 25% Same as  
Tier 1
Same as  
Tier 1
Same as  
Tier 1
Total  
Height28  
Add one story 
up to 11 ft.
Same as  
Tier 1
Add two 
stories up to 
22 ft.
Add three 
stories up to 
33 ft.
Transitional 
Height 
Step Back29 
45º from a 
horizontal 
plane origi-
nating 15 ft. 
above grade
Same as  
Tier 1
45º from a 
horizontal 
plane origi-
nating 25 ft. 
above grade
Within the 
first 25 ft. of 
the property 
line, 45º from 
a horizontal 
plane origi-
nating 25 ft. 
above grade 
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Three other additional menu incentives are available in all tiers30:
n  Projects located on two or more contiguous parcels may average the floor area, density, 
open space, and parking over the project site, and permit vehicular access from a less 
restrictive zone to a more restrictive zone, assuming the project is permitted by the under-
lying zoning on each parcel and no further lot line adjustment or subdivision is required.
n  Any land area required to be dedicated for a street or alley may be included as lot area 
for purposes of calculating the maximum density permitted by the underlying zone of the 
project site.
n  In lieu of L.A.M.C. requirements, a joint public-private development may include the uses 
and area standards permitted in the least restrictive adjoining zone.
The Planning Director determines availability of these additional menu incentives. The 
Director must grant the additional incentives if the project meets the TOC Guidelines require-
ments, unless the Director finds (1) an incentive is not required to provide for affordable housing 
costs or rents, or (2) the incentive will cause a specific adverse impact on public health and 
safety, the physical environment, or a listed historic resource, and there is no way to mitigate the 
impact without rendering the project unaffordable to VLI, LI, or MI households.31
The below chart compares two scenarios for projects located in Tier 4, and demonstrates 
the significant base incentives that are available under the TOC Program even without submit-
ting to the discretionary City process to take the added menu incentives:
30 Id. at 13-14.
31 Id. at 11, L.A.M.C. 12.22 A.25(g)(2).
32 These calculations assume one unit for 400 feet of lot area per the L.A.M.C.
33 This number was calculated using an average of 1.5 spaces/unit based on L.A.M.C. requirements for residential units.
N  75 base units
N  3:1 FAR on a 30,000 sf lot with 
25,000 sf buildable area,  
translating to 75,000 sf of  
floor area
N  113 parking spaces33
N  135 units (80% density bonus) 
N  At least 15 affordable units (at 
11% ELI)
 N  4.25:1 FAR, translating to 
106,250 sf of floor area
N  No parking required
ORIGINAL 
PROJECT32
USING TOC PROGRAM 
INCENTIVES
Residential 
Only
N  150 base units
N  1.5:1 FAR on a 60,000 sf lot, 
translating to 90,000 sf of floor 
area
N  225 residential parking spaces, 
plus between 1/100 sf and 
1/500 sf of non-residential 
parking, depending on use
N  270 base units (80% density 
bonus)
N  At least 30 affordable units (at 
11% ELI)
N  4.25:1 FAR translating to 
255,000 sf of floor area
N  No parking required for residen-
tial component; 40% reduction 
Mixed-Use in 
Commercial 
Zone
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While additional menu incentives may prove beneficial for a project, the City considers the 
process of obtaining additional menu incentives to be discretionary. As discussed in additional 
detail in Section III.B.2 infra, the discretionary nature of the process may require projects to 
comply with CEQA.
At least one analysis of Measure JJJ has concluded that the benefits of the TOC Program 
have been offset by reductions in zone change and other entitlement applications, which also 
lead to production of both market-rate and affordable housing, and has suggested that the 
TOC Program be strengthened to account for this effect.34 While this paper does not assess the 
overall impacts of Measure JJJ as a whole or the particular recommendations of that report, 
it does concur that strengthening the TOC Program could yield positive results for increased 
production of deed-restricted affordable housing in the City and offers recommendations to 
address specific legal barriers that present hurdles to the program’s efficacy.
Is TOC really leading to the production of more 
affordable units? Could it produce even more?
The TOC Program has now been in effect for nearly two years, and the City of Los Angeles is 
closely tracking the ordinance’s implementation. While the number of requests for TOC incen-
tives and permitted TOC projects indicate the program is contributing to the addition of a signif-
icant number of affordable housing units city-wide, the implementation challenges discussed 
below may still be constraining the program’s ability to meet its full potential.
TOC By the Numbers
The City of Los Angeles’s initial assessment indicates that the TOC Program appears to be 
on track to increase the number of permitted affordable housing units. Hundreds of projects 
have requested TOC incentives from the City, and project developers are using the TOC Program 
far more often than other incentives programs, including California’s Density Bonus Law, to 
propose and seek permits for affordable housing units.35 By the end of 2018, a little over a year 
after the TOC Program was implemented, proposed housing entitlements through the program 
represented 30 percent of all proposed housing entitlements in the City.
Since the TOC Program’s inception, it has earned the distinction of being the strongest 
driver of new housing, a trend that continued into 2019.  During the second quarter of 2019, 
the TOC Program accounted for nearly half of all housing units proposed through discretionary 
applications. Moreover, the share of deed-restricted affordable housing units in the City’s devel-
opment pipeline that were proposed through the program has increased to 19.4 percent from 
a previous high of 18 percent in the fourth quarter of 2018. In total, the TOC Program has added 
nearly 20,000 new housing units to the City’s development pipeline since its 2017 launch, and 
34 Mark Vallianatos et al., laplUs and real estate developMent & desiGn proGraM, ColleGe of environMental desiGn, University of California 
at Berkeley, Measure JJJ: An evaluation of impacts on residential development in the City of Los Angeles (May 2019), available at 
https://wordpressstorageaccount.blob.core.windows.net/wp-media/wp-content/uploads/sites/867/2019/06/2019-Mea-
sure-JJJ-An-Evaluation-of-impacts-on-residential-development-in-City-LA.pdf. 
35 The City of Los Angeles tracks trends in housing production on a quarterly basis through its Housing Progress Report. 
See City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Housing Progress Report—Quarterly Report: April-June 2019, available 
at https://planning.lacity.org/odocument/c795255d-9367-4fdf-9568-0a34077720ef; see also City of los anGeles departMent 
of City planninG, Housing Progress Report—Quarterly Report: January-March 2019, available at https://planning.lacity.org/
odocument/c82e412b-9d5a-4306-8e19-48bd17ebd752.
While the TOC Program 
is contributing to the 
addition of a significant 
number of affordable 
housing units city-
wide, implementation 
challenges may still 
be constraining the 
program’s ability to meet 
its full potential.
 WWW.LAW.UCLA.EDU/EMMETT PRITZKER BRIEF NO. 13 | NOVEMBER 201913
EMMETT INSTITUTE ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The TOC Program has 
driven, and continues 
to drive, the City’s 
production of deed-
restricted affordable 
housing units.
nearly 4,000 of those units are deed-restricted affordable housing units. The City announced in 
early 2019 that during the past calendar year, the City had produced more housing than it has 
annually in the past 30 years. The City credited the TOC Program as a major contributor to this 
housing increase.36  
The TOC Program has not only driven the City’s generation of housing units generally, but 
also has specifically driven, and continues to drive, its generation of deed-restricted affordable 
housing. Market-rate developers have utilized the program to add density to their projects, 
adding a significant number of affordable units along with that density. Furthermore, all-af-
fordable housing projects are eligible to use the TOC Program and receive additional incentives 
through it, adding more housing units to all-affordable projects.37 In the first quarter of 2019, 
75 percent of all proposed deed-restricted affordable housing units in the City—of which there 
were nearly 1,000—took advantage of TOC Program incentives.38 Affordable housing unit pro-
duction through the TOC Program appears to be on the upswing: the number of deed-restricted 
affordable housing units proposed through the program increased by over 150 percent from 
the fourth quarter of 2018 to the first quarter of 2019.39 Of the proposed units, 40 percent are 
designated to serve ELI households.40 The City predicts that nearly 4,000 new deed-restricted 
affordable housing units will be in the development pipeline by the end of 2019 as a result.41 
And ground is starting to break on projects that have used the TOC Program, translating these 
affordable units to a reality—by the second quarter of 2019, 65 percent of proposed TOC proj-
ects had applied for building permits, and many had received early-start permits to begin work.42
36 See City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Housing Progress Report—Quarterly Report: January-March 2019 at 3.
37 This fact accounts, in part, for the 20 percent share of deed-restricted affordable housing units proposed through the 
TOC Program, as many market-rate developers are electing to build housing for ELI residents, which range from rates of 8 
percent to 11 percent depending on tier. 
38 City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Housing Progress Report—Quarterly Report: January-March 2019, supra note 
35, at 4.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Housing Progress Report—Quarterly Report: April-June 2019, supra note 35, at 4.
42 Id. at 4.
Graphic provided by Los Angeles Department of City Planning.
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Projects proposed 
through the TOC 
Program continue to 
be sited in areas of Los 
Angeles with good 
access to job centers and 
mass transit.
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Projects proposed through the TOC Program also continue to be sited in areas of Los Angeles 
with good access to job centers and mass transit.  Half of all proposed TOC Program projects are 
located in Central Los Angeles, an area that includes Wilshire Center, Koreatown, and Holly-
wood.43 Westside neighborhoods with strong mass transit access, like Palms, Mar Vista, West Los 
Angeles, and Westchester, represent another 15 percent of proposed projects.44 In other words, 
the TOC Program appears to be meeting its objective to site new housing units in areas of the 
City that are better served by mass transit. 
Potential Challenges for TOC Program Implementation
Although the City of Los Angeles has documented a continued rise in TOC Program appli-
cations since the program became available in late 2017, there are a number of possible con-
straints on the program’s implementation that could prevent projects near major transit stops 
from utilizing the program. These constraints reduce the number of total deed-restricted afford-
able housing units the TOC Program could potentially produce.
While some constraints are economic,45 this paper focuses on potential legal constraints that 
could impact the TOC Program due to conflicts with existing zoning or discretionary approval 
regimes in the City. This section of the paper identifies three such possible constraints, and 
considers potential methods to reduce their impacts, either through interagency cooperation 
or through modifications to the existing TOC Program.
Before moving into a discussion of the three identified possible legal constraints, it is 
important to highlight a pending lawsuit that challenges the validity of the TOC Program and 
poses a potential threat to the program’s stability.46 This challenge was filed in late August 2019 
by a neighborhood group, Fix the City, well known in Los Angeles for its efforts to challenge 
other community- and city-wide transit-oriented development plans.47 
Fix the City’s lawsuit challenges the TOC Program via its application to one development 
project, which is sited in a densely developed area of West Los Angeles, on a major thorough-
fare and close to the skyscrapers and multi-story mall of Century City. The lawsuit contends 
that the project was improperly granted density, height, and setback incentives through the 
TOC Program—and that the incentives were improperly granted not because the City did not 
apply the program’s requirements correctly, but because the program itself is inconsistent with 
Measure JJJ. The lawsuit alleges that Measure JJJ was intended to require labor standards to 
apply to development projects that sought certain zone changes—the kinds of zone changes 
the project in question would have needed if the TOC Program were not available—and the TOC 
Program goes beyond what voters authorized by allowing incentives, like height and setback 
incentives, that are not contemplated in Measure JJJ. 
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 For example, material costs for high-rise construction (which requires steel rather than wood-frame construction) can 
sometimes mean that a project developer only takes partial advantage of a TOC Program density bonus incentive, which 
limits the number of deed-restricted affordable housing units included in the project. 
46 Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, et al., Case No. 19STCP03740 (Aug. 30, 2019).
47 See, e.g., Bianca Barragan, CUrBed la, Anti-Development Group Forcing LA to Take Back Big-Deal Plan For Less Car-Cen-
tric City (Nov. 9, 2015), available at https://la.curbed.com/2015/11/9/9902490/los-angeles-mobility-plan-lawsuit; David 
Zahniser, los anGeles tiMes, Judge deals a major blow to Hollywood growth plan (Dec. 11, 2013), available at https://www.
latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-judge-hollywood-growth-plan-20131211-story.html. 
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While assessing the validity of Fix the City’s claims and offering recommendations regarding 
pending litigation at the City are outside the scope of this paper, the lawsuit may at least tempo-
rarily chill use of the TOC Program, which, in addition to the constraints discussed in this paper, 
would further restrict its efficacy. It is also worth noting that there is potential for the lawsuit to 
resolve in such a way as to require a follow-on ballot measure to achieve the objectives of the TOC 
Program. In that event, such a measure could provide a vehicle for adoption of some of the recom-
mendations in this paper, such as a pilot program to test streamlining in Tiers 3 and 4 or permitting 
the program to apply in the limited case of a zone change from industrial to residential use. 
This paper will now turn its focus to other legal hurdles to full implementation of the TOC 
Program’s core goals.
1.  Conflicts with the successor agency to the City’s former Community  
Redevelopment Agency. 
The first such limitation involves conflicts between the TOC Program and the requirements 
of land use plans administered by the Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles, a 
Designated Local Authority (CRA/LA-DLA). CRA/LA-DLA is a successor agency to the City’s Com-
munity Redevelopment Agency, and currently administers redevelopment plan areas, some of 
which impose development limitations that can limit the application of TOC Program incentives.
Community redevelopment agencies were originally authorized by California’s Community 
Redevelopment Act in 1945 and became part of a post-World War II effort to promote urban 
renewal. By 1952, a tax-increment financing structure put in place by Proposition 18 gave local 
governments the authority to declare certain areas as “blighted” and in need of renewal, allow-
ing local governments to distribute property tax revenue growth in that area to the redevel-
opment agency as revenue.48 Redevelopment agencies were legally obligated to use those tax 
dollars to reduce blight and encourage economic activity in the designated redevelopment 
plan areas, and California law gave redevelopment agencies significant authority to regulate 
land uses and development within those areas. Over the years, the number and scope of rede-
velopment plan areas expanded, and some expressed concerns that redevelopment agencies’ 
growth was coming at the expense of funding for other local programs; by 2008, redevelop-
ment agencies received 12 percent of statewide property tax revenue.49 But while the agencies’ 
roles and administration of their funds became controversial, they provided the largest source 
of revenue for affordable housing in California.50
In 2011, the California Legislature enacted legislation that dissolved redevelopment agen-
cies statewide; when the redevelopment agencies were formally dissolved in early 2012 after 
a period of litigation, agencies were appointed to wind down the existing operations of the 
redevelopment agencies, including administering their assets and liabilities.51 The City of Los 
Angeles chose not to become the successor agency to the Community Redevelopment Agency 
of Los Angeles (CRA/LA), and as a result, Governor Brown appointed a Designated Local Author-
ity (DLA) to wind down CRA/LA’s operations.52 While the responsibility of CRA/LA-DLA is primar-
48 Casey Blount, et al., U.s. departMent of hoUsinG and UrBan developMent, Redevelopment Agencies in California: History, Benefits, 
Excesses, and Closure (Jan. 2014) at 1, available at https://huduser.gov/portal/publications/Redevelopment_WhitePaper.pdf.
49 Id. at 2.
50 Katy Murphy, san Jose MerCUry news, California lawmakers want to bring back local redevelopment agencies (Mar. 16, 2018), 
available at https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/03/16/sjm-l-redevelop-0317/.
51 California departMent of finanCe, Redevelopment Agency Dissolution, available at www.dof.ca.gov/Programs/Redevelopment.
52 City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Recommendation Report: Case No. CPC-2013-3169-CA (May 8, 2014) at 3, avail-
able at http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2013/13-1482-s1_misc_e_6-16-14.pdf.
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ily to administer the former CRA/LA’s enforceable obligations and dispose of its assets, it also 
plays a role in the administration of the former CRA/LA’s redevelopment plan areas because the 
dissolution legislation did not abolish the redevelopment plan areas or eliminate the redevel-
opment plans that govern them.53 
In the City of Los Angeles, CRA/LA-DLA has authority over 19 active redevelopment plan 
areas, each of which has a redevelopment plan that specifies permitted land uses and prohibi-
tions or limitations, like density limitations, on land uses. In mid-2018, CRA/LA-DLA released a 
memorandum articulating its position on the interplay between the land use provisions set forth 
in its redevelopment plans and the TOC Program. Because its authority over redevelopment plan 
areas is derived from state law, CRA/LA-DLA has taken the position that its land use authority 
to administer redevelopment plans exceeds that of the City Planning Department, and that as a 
result, the land use requirements of the redevelopment plans—in particular, the density limits set 
by redevelopment plans—trump application of the TOC Program when the two conflict.54 CRA/
LA-DLA clearance is required for projects located in redevelopment plan areas.
In practical effect, this means that there are multiple redevelopment areas within the City 
where redevelopment plans may bar developers from utilizing TOC Program incentives to their 
full extent, restricting the number of housing units that may be built. At this time, the City seems 
to concur that developers seeking TOC Program incentives in those redevelopment areas will be 
constrained by the limits in the redevelopment plans.55 CRA/LA-DLA initially asserted that the 
conflict would impact six redevelopment plan areas—City Center, Central Industrial, Hollywood, 
53 Id. at 3.
54 Cra/la, a desiGnated loCal aUthority, Transit Oriented Communities (TOC) Density Bonuses (Jun. 27, 2018).
55 City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Advisory Memo on Application of Transit Oriented Communities (TOC) Incen-
tives in CRA/LA Redevelopment Plan Areas (Jan. 9, 2019), available at https://planning.lacity.org/ordinances/docs/TOC/
adopted/AdvisoryMemo.pdf.
Hollywood/Western Metro Station
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North Hollywood, Wilshire Center/Koreatown, and Pacific Corridor—and estimated that at least 
25 TOC Program projects, including over 200 affordable housing units and over 50 permanent 
supportive housing units, mostly in the Hollywood and Wilshire Center/Koreatown areas, would 
be restricted in their ability to take advantage of program incentives as a result.  
Upon direction by the City Council, Planning Department staff assessed the status of 
impacted projects, as well as any direction project applicants received from the City about the 
conflict and the status of ongoing efforts to address the conflict with CRA/LA-DLA.56 The Plan-
56 City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Community Redevelopment Agency/Los Angeles Designated Local Authority 
(CRA/LA-DLA) and Measure JJJ Transit Oriented Communities Incentives; CF 18-1023 (Apr. 4, 2019), available at https://
clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2018/18-1023_rpt_PLAN_04-04-2019.pdf.
North Hollywood
Hollywood
Central Industrial
Maps provided by CRA/LA, a Designated Local Authority.
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ning Department concluded that only three redevelopment plan areas—Hollywood, North Hol-
lywood, and Central Industrial—should be affected , eliminating the impact of the conflict in 
the Wilshire Center/Koreatown area where a number of projects seeking to utilize TOC Program 
incentives have been proposed.57 As of April, 16 projects in the Hollywood and North Hollywood 
redevelopment plan areas were impacted by the conflict; the Planning Department indicated 
that it had reached out to project applicants to suggest that they explore using the Density 
Bonus Law or other entitlement options instead of the TOC Program.58 
The Planning Department’s proposed workaround raises a key issue for project applicants 
in these plan areas; utilizing the Density Bonus Law or conditional use entitlements instead of 
the TOC Program incentives can mean that a project moves from ministerial approval to discre-
tionary approval, increasing its potential vulnerability to legal challenges.59 Utilizing these path-
ways instead of the TOC Program could also result in a reduction in the number of permitted 
deed-restricted affordable housing units, as the Density Bonus Law offers density incentives at 
a lower percentage of committed affordable housing units than is required by the TOC Program. 
And, as noted above, the Density Bonus Law does not offer incentives at the ELI level, so inabil-
ity to use the TOC Program could reduce the availability of deed-restricted units for individuals 
and families at this most vulnerable income level. The Planning Department’s assessment of 
impacted projects also offers a limited snapshot; as applications to utilize TOC Program incen-
tives continue to rise, the conflict may worsen, and there is no way to accurately capture the 
number of forgone development projects that are not pursued—and the number of deed-re-
stricted affordable housing units never developed—as a result.
At this time, interagency cooperation between CRA/LA-DLA and the Planning Department 
remains the best hope for resolving this issue. While the Planning Department’s proposed 
workaround could still lead to the production of some number of deed-restricted affordable 
housing units, it is not an ideal solution. In the past, the City of Los Angeles has contemplated 
accepting a transfer of CRA/LA-DLA’s land use authority under the redevelopment plans60; 
doing so could effectively eliminate this conflict. However, questions remain about the City’s 
administration of CRA/LA-DLA’s land use authority, and confirming the City’s responsibility 
to adhere to past CRA/LA-DLA agreements that guarantee the preservation of lower-income 
housing is critical to ensuring the availability of affordable housing.61 Until these issues can be 
resolved, the Planning Department’s imperfect solution may be the only option, but the TOC 
Program’s ability to produce more deed-restricted affordable housing in affected plan areas is 
likely to remain constrained. 
For now, the Planning 
Department’s imperfect 
solution may be the 
best option, but the 
TOC Program’s ability 
to produce more deed-
restricted affordable 
housing in affected plan 
areas is likely to remain 
constrained.
57 Id. at 2. CRA/LA-DLA has not challenged the City’s assessment that only projects in three redevelopment plan areas are 
affected.
58 Id. at 3-4.
59 As discussed in Section III.B.2, infra, discretionary approvals are subject to CEQA, while ministerial approvals are not. A 
discretionary approval process increases the likelihood that a project will be challenged under CEQA, adding a risk of pro-
tracted litigation that may dissuade developers and their investors from pursuing a project.
60 City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Recommendation Report: Case No. CPC-2013-3169-CA, supra note 52. On 
August 27, 2019, the City Council’s Planning and Land Use Management Committee approved a CEQA exemption for a 
proposed City Council resolution and ordinance delegating CRA/LA-DLA’s land use authority to the City, but keeping the 
redevelopment plans intact. The proposed ordinance contains express language stating that the redevelopment plans will 
supersede the Municipal Code and City ordinances to the extent that there is any conflict, perpetuating the constraint iden-
tified in this section. See City of los anGeles planninG and land Use ManaGeMent CoMMittee, Council File No. 13-1482-S3 (Aug. 27, 
2019), available at http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2013/13-1482-S3_ord_draft_08-23-2019.pdf. 
61 See leGal aid foUndation of los anGeles, Letter to Los Angeles City Council Planning & Land Use Management Committee 
(Aug. 9, 2016), available at https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2013/13-1482-S1_pc_8-9-16.pdf.
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2. Impacts of discretionary review processes.
There are multiple ways in which projects that are eligible for TOC Program incentives could 
become subject to discretionary review—review that requires the exercise of judgment or 
deliberation by the City in determining whether to approve the project—if they utilize those 
incentives. Because discretionary review can complicate the development process, some devel-
opers may choose not to take full advantage of program incentives—or choose not to use them 
at all. The end result of such choices would be fewer affordable housing units, limiting achieve-
ment of the program’s goals.
The California Environmental Quality Act, or CEQA, is an environmental review statute 
applicable to plans and projects in the state that require discretionary approval from a govern-
ment agency.62 The law requires government agencies, before approving a project, to assess 
the significance of a project’s environmental impacts and to identify and require measures to 
mitigate significant impacts when feasible.63 In addition to its important function of lessening 
or avoiding project environmental impacts where possible, CEQA serves an important public 
disclosure function, allowing for community and stakeholder participation in project approval 
processes with the goal of increasing transparency in those processes.
Because the statute itself does not delegate enforcement authority to any particular 
state agency, CEQA enforcement comes in the form of private litigation against projects that 
allegedly fail to satisfy the law’s requirements. As the housing shortage has worsened in recent 
62 Cal. pUB. res. Code § 21080.
63 See Cal. pUB. res. Code § 21002.1.
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years, CEQA has come under attack for what some claim is its role in perpetuating the crisis.64 
Proponents of this theory argue that CEQA can be abused when individuals, organizations, or 
community groups with a “not in my backyard” approach, or other organized interests like labor 
groups, use the statute to sue projects for purposes unrelated to the environmental objectives it 
was designed to achieve. Such lawsuits can be used as tools to delay a project or to extract other 
concessions from the project developer. Because CEQA challenges take time and resources to 
litigate, potentially impacting a project’s bottom line, some say that the threat of CEQA litiga-
tion chills development of key infill projects that could help alleviate the housing shortage.
But other studies show that CEQA litigation, while certainly a risk for project developers, 
impacts only a very small percentage of all projects that undergo CEQA review.65 A review of 
CEQA litigation data also does not demonstrate that litigation frequency is trending upward, 
meaning that there have not been more CEQA suits on an annual basis as the housing crisis has 
progressed.66 However, even without litigation, the CEQA review process can itself take between 
10 and 29 months,67 and the litigation process can extend for an average of 18 to 24 months 
beyond that. In a changing market, financing options for a project can become more uncertain, 
or can disappear altogether, during that timeframe. Developers and their investors do view the 
possibility of CEQA review and litigation as an additional project risk when evaluating develop-
ment potential for sites, 68 and in Los Angeles in particular, recent years have seen high-profile 
CEQA litigation challenges, some resulting in major project stalls.69 Weighing these factors has 
led some Los Angeles developers to focus their efforts on pursuit of by-right projects: projects 
consistent with existing zoning and that do not require discretionary approvals from the City. 
These kinds of ministerial projects are exempt from the CEQA process but are also relatively 
low-density.
Projects utilizing the TOC Program can be subject to discretionary review in two different 
ways. First, while some menu incentives are ministerial—they are automatically granted by the 
City if certain conditions are met—others are not, and the determination to allow for those 
64 For example, some have claimed that infill development projects are disproportionately the subject of CEQA challenges. 
See Jennifer Hernandez, et al., holland & kniGht, In the Name of the Environment (Jul. 14, 2015), available at https://issuu.com/
hollandknight/docs/ceqa_litigation_abuseissuu. Others have challenged the methodology behind these claims, contend-
ing they use a nonstandard and misleading definition of infill, or are flawed in other ways. See, e.g., Sean Hecht, leGal planet, 
Anti-CEQA Lobbyists Turn to Empirical Analysis, But Are Their Conclusions Sound? (Sept. 28, 2015), available at https://legal-
planet.org/2015/09/28/anti-ceqa-lobbyists-turn-to-empirical-analysis-but-are-their-conclusions-sound/.
65 See rose foUndation, CEQA in the 21st Century: Environmental Quality, Economic Prosperity, and Sustainable Development in Cali-
fornia (Aug. 2016), available at https://rosefdn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CEQA-in-the-21st-Century.pdf.
66 Id. at ii.
67 Id. at iii.
68 See MGAC, Los Angeles Construction Market Mid-Year Report 2018 (Jun. 2018), available at https://www.mgac.com/blog/
wp-content/uploads/2018/08/MGAC-Los-Angeles-Construction-Market-Mid-Year-Report-2018.pdf?utm_source=LA%20
market%20report&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=AB%20bottom (noting that challenges as part of the entitlements 
process have deterred foreign developers from building in Los Angeles).
69 See, e.g., Bianca Barragan, CUrBed los anGeles, AIDS Healthcare Foundation sues LA over Crossroads of the World rede-
velopment (Feb. 21, 2019), available at https://la.curbed.com/2019/2/21/18234996/aids-healthcare-foundation-law-
suit-crossroads-of-the-world-development (challenging redevelopment of the Crossroads of the World site as a mixed-use 
transit-oriented development project with 950 residential units, including deed-restricted affordable housing units); 
BUsinesswire, AHF Sues City of Los Angeles, Council Members and Developer over Hollywood’s Palladium Project (Apr. 21, 
2016), available at https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160421006848/en/AHF-Sues-City-Los-Angeles-Coun-
cil-Members (CEQA lawsuit challenged mixed-use development project near the Hollywood Palladium Theater); Bianca 
Barragan, CUrBed los anGeles, Judge Tanks Plans for Two Giant Towers by Capitol Records (Apr. 30, 2014), available at https://
la.curbed.com/2015/4/30/9965214/judge-tanks-plans-for-two-giant-towers-by-capitol-records (CEQA lawsuit halted con-
struction of the Millennium Hollywood high-rise project). These high-profile cases have largely been due to the efforts of 
a handful of individuals and organizations but have captured significant attention in the city. And while the 2017-2018 
period saw a rise in housing construction, 2019 data suggests construction may be slowing. See Elijah Chiland, CUrBed los 
anGeles, LA housing construction surging—for now (Aug. 13, 2019), available at https://la.curbed.com/2019/8/13/20802833/
los-angeles-housing-development-data-construction.
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additional incentives is a discretionary one.70 The discretionary review process applicable to TOC 
Program bonuses is less onerous than that which applies to other discretionary City approvals, 
such as requests for zone changes; discretionary TOC Program bonuses are approved by review 
of the Planning Director, and a public hearing is required only in the event of an appeal. By 
contrast, zone changes and General Plan amendments require multiple public hearings cul-
minating in approval by the City Council, a far lengthier and more involved political process. 
Nonetheless, even the TOC Program’s more limited discretionary process triggers CEQA review. 
Second, all projects in the City that exceed 50 net new residential units are subject to the 
site plan review process, which is discretionary, regardless of whether or not those projects 
would otherwise have been permitted by-right given a site’s zoning.71 The City has clarified 
that site plan review requirements apply to the base number of allowable residential units on 
a site.72 In other words, if a project would contain fewer than 50 base residential units, but by 
virtue of ministerial TOC Program incentives, more than 50 units may be proposed, site plan 
review requirements still would not apply. But for larger projects hoping to take advantage of 
TOC Program incentives, even when those incentives are ministerial, the discretionary site plan 
review process will be necessary. 
Developers interested in a by-right approval process may choose to avoid using discre-
tionary TOC Program incentives or to avoid developing larger projects on TOC Program-eligible 
sites, which could impact the number of deed-restricted affordable housing units ultimately 
permitted through the program. For example, while density bonuses are ministerial under the 
TOC Program, discretionary incentives, like height increases or setback reductions, may be nec-
essary to make the most of those bonuses. If a developer chooses not to pursue those discre-
tionary incentives in favor of a ministerial process, forgone density could mean a lower absolute 
number of deed-restricted affordable housing units in a project (because required affordable 
housing is defined as a percentage of total housing units). Similarly, a developer seeking to 
avoid the discretionary site plan review process entirely may choose to build a project of fewer 
than 50 units on a site that has more zoned capacity, and in so doing, would not take advan-
tage of the TOC Program incentives at all—meaning that developer would not be bound by the 
affordable housing obligations that come along with those incentives. Finally, developers leery 
of the discretionary process could focus their attention on development of smaller sites with 
density limited to 49 units or less, limiting the number of larger projects with more potential 
impact to produce deed-restricted affordable housing units.
Still, as discussed above, questions remain about the extent to which discretionary review pro-
cesses chill infill development. In part, those questions persist due to a dearth of data and analysis 
that could assist policymakers in understanding the role discretionary review plays in developers’ 
choices to use—or not use—density bonus incentives. Some advocate for streamlining benefits 
that would apply to infill development projects like those eligible for the TOC Program, and would 
free developers from having to consider the impacts of discretionary review—particularly the 
threat of CEQA litigation—when making these choices. But streamlining can come with signifi-
cant consequences for public disclosure processes and community involvement, meaning that 
policymakers should be wary of making indiscriminate streamlining changes without knowing 
70 See TOC Program Guidelines, supra note 15, at 9, 11; L.A.M.C. 12.22 A.25(g)(2).
71 L.A.M.C. 16.05. The result of this requirement is that virtually all projects that attain transit-supportive density are subject to 
discretionary site plan review.
72 TOC Program Guidelines, supra note 15, at 9.
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more about the impact of discretionary review processes on the use of density incentives.
The TOC Program could offer opportunities to gather data that would clarify whether, and 
how much, discretionary review processes are chilling maximum development of TOC Pro-
gram-eligible parcels. One way to collect this data would be to institute a short-term pilot project 
in Tier 3 and 4 areas testing the impact of further streamlining. For one year, the City could test 
two measures that could theoretically increase the number of projects taking advantage of TOC 
Program incentives in Tiers 3 and 4: (1) making all discretionary TOC Program incentives minis-
terial and (2) eliminating site plan review for projects up to 100 base units, both in exchange for 
an increase in the required percentage of deed-restricted affordable housing units.73 
The pilot could be restricted to Tier 3 and 4 areas that do not abut single-family residential 
properties, to limit any perceived impact on neighborhood character, and could additionally 
require that any development taking advantage of the pilot be required to provide discounted 
transit passes to all residents for 3 years. This could have the effect of increasing the number of 
by-right TOC Program projects in the areas best-served by mass transit, while also requiring that 
significant numbers of residential units be set aside for low-income residents. The year-long 
time limitation for the pilot would allow the City to assess developers’ interest and impact on 
overall number of permitted deed-restricted affordable housing units through the TOC Program 
without more substantial and longer-term program revisions, while further promoting the pro-
gram’s affordability and transit-oriented development goals. 
In proposing such a pilot project, this paper does not adopt the view that the CEQA 
process or CEQA litigation plays an outsize role in the perpetuation of housing shortages. 
This paper also strongly advocates that any streamlining of discretionary approval processes 
not be taken lightly: CEQA is an important public participation and environmental mitigation 
tool, and where environmental review obligations under CEQA are eliminated, advocates of 
streamlining should consider requiring additional benefits in the public interest, like increased 
percentages of deed-restricted affordable housing, to ensure the needs of disadvantaged 
communities are met. However, a short-term pilot project such as the one proposed here 
would be a limited measure that could help clarify the ways in which discretionary approval 
processes constrain, if at all, the number of housing units built through the TOC Program.
3. Lack of application in cases of zone change.
The TOC Program also has a constraint built into its framework: the program cannot be 
used if a project receives the benefit of “any development bonus or other incentive granting 
additional residential units or floor area provided through a General Plan Amendment, Zone 
Change, Height District Change, or any affordable housing development bonus in a Transit 
Neighborhood Plan, Community Plan Implementation Overlay (CPIO), Specific Plan, or overlay 
district.”74 The provision appears intended to address “double-dipping”—preventing a project 
from using multiple density bonuses on top of each other. But because of its import for indus-
trially-zoned and conditionally-zoned properties, it may have unintended consequences that 
could limit the production of additional deed-restricted affordable housing units. It removes 
73 Recommended increases in the required percentage of deed-restricted affordable housing units would be to 14 percent 
ELI, 19 percent VLI, 33 percent LI, or 33 percent MI in a common interest development in Tier 3 or 15 percent ELI, 20 percent 
VLI, 35 percent LI, or 35 percent MI in a common interest development in Tier 4. Current required affordable housing per-
centages to receive the maximum number of discretionary additional incentives under the TOC Program are 11 percent ELI, 
15 percent VLI, 30 percent LI, or 30 percent MI in a common interest development. See Section II, supra.
74 TOC Program Guidelines, supra note 15, at 7. 
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a potential incentive to convert non-residential properties to residential use, and results in 
confusion about the effect of certain pre-TOC zone changes. 
Potentially the most significant of these consequences is the impact that the provision has on 
industrially-zoned properties close to major transit stops.75 Many industrially-zoned properties in the 
City are use-restricted such that a zone change would be required to site residential units on them. 
Applying for such a zone change would, however, make them ineligible for TOC Program incentives. 
The City has recently taken some steps to modify the zoning of certain industrial prop-
erties near mass transit, but many industrially-zoned properties are not impacted by those 
modifications. For example, the Exposition Corridor Transit Neighborhood Plan, approved 
last year, will allow taller mixed-use buildings within a half-mile radius of five Westside Expo 
Line stops, rezoning some industrial properties to allow for residential development.76 The 
plan also includes its own affordable housing incentive program, which supersedes the TOC 
Program in covered plan areas. This program offers a density bonus and parking incentives 
provided a project commits to 10 percent ELI, 14 percent VLI, or 23 percent LI deed-restricted 
affordable housing units.77 However, the Exposition Corridor Transit Neighborhood Plan 
affects a limited number of properties and does not impact zoning near any Expo Line station 
east of Culver City. Industrially-zoned properties remain elsewhere in the City, including near 
mass transit in Downtown Los Angeles. 
The process for converting these properties to residential zoning will not necessarily result 
in the production of deed-restricted affordable housing units at the levels required by the TOC 
Program. And significantly, conversion would bar a developer from using TOC Program incen-
tives that come with an obligation to produce more affordable housing.78 Properties like these 
can only be a net gain from a housing perspective: they move from a prohibition on housing 
units to some permitted number of housing units after a zone change. Rendering them ineli-
gible for TOC Program incentives, however, removes an important incentive that could prompt 
the development of more deed-restricted affordable housing units when these properties do 
turn over. Zone changes alone typically cannot result in the amount of density available to 
developers through ministerial TOC Program incentives; the Municipal Code applies a 1 unit 
per 400 square foot unit density ratio to much residential and mixed-use zoning, meaning that 
developers must weather the more time-intensive and riskier variance process to add density. 
Nor will a zone change itself result in reduced parking requirements, which the TOC Program 
allows ministerially. And in many cases a zone change will not implement reduced yard and 
75 Another unintended consequence, albeit one with less likely impact on a project’s number of deed-restricted affordable 
housing units, is the effect on parking reductions, which are one tool the City has to incent increased transit use. Under the 
TOC Program, parking reductions are ministerial, but through the zone change process, they are discretionary; this means 
that industrial properties near mass transit that utilize the zone change process alone to convert to a residential use could 
face significant opposition with respect to parking requirements that would otherwise be eliminated if the zone change 
were sought first and then the TOC Program were utilized to reduce parking requirements.
76 See City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Exposition Corridor Transit Neighborhood Plan, Council File No. CPC-2013-621-
ZC-CPA-SP (approved Aug. 2, 2018), available at http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2018/18-0437_misc_1_05-17-2018.pdf.
77 Id. at 3-5. These percentages are slightly lower than the 11 percent ELI, 15 percent VLI, or 25 percent LI required in Tier 4 
under the TOC Program, so for projects sited in what would otherwise be designated a Tier 4 area, the plan’s application 
would result in slightly fewer deed-restricted affordable housing units. The plan also eliminates site plan review for projects 
in the plan area, which means tracking projects that seek affordable housing-related density bonus incentives in the plan 
area could be another way to track the impact of lessening site plan review requirements near mass transit.
78 Measure JJJ requires that, where a zone change would permit a residential use where none was previously allowed, 5 
percent of total project units must be provided at rents affordable to ELI households, and either 11 percent of total project 
units must be provided at rents affordable to VLI households or 20 percent of total project units must be provided at rents 
affordable to LI households. Measure JJJ, Sec. 11.5.11(a)(1)(iii). These affordability percentages are consistent with TOC 
Program requirements in Tier 1.
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setback requirements, which can increase building envelope and are available through the dis-
cretionary TOC Program process. In other words, where a developer is considering the value 
of engaging in the zone change process, eligibility for TOC Program incentives could offer the 
developer a reason to convert the property.
A second potential consequence involves properties that were subject to a conditional 
zone or height district change when the TOC Program became effective. While the TOC Program 
incentives clearly apply to a site’s existing zoning, when conditional zone changes are at play, 
an added wrinkle could create confusion about the availability of program incentives. In some 
cases, a project’s zone change is subject to a “Q,” or qualified, condition, meaning that the zone 
change becomes effective once the condition has been met.79 If a property was already entitled 
for a conditional zone change when the TOC Program went into effect, but the condition has 
not yet cleared, it is unclear whether the “existing zoning” for purposes of applying TOC Program 
incentives is the approved zoning, with the Q Condition attached, or the pre-entitlement site 
zoning. Developers who take title to a Q-conditioned property before the condition has cleared 
may also wonder whether the clearance of the condition represents a zone change that would 
render the project ineligible for TOC Program incentives. While this scenario is likely to have 
far less impact than the issue of industrially-zoned properties, ambiguity on this point could 
further constrain application of the TOC Program.
The City could take steps to address both of these potential issues. With respect to indus-
trially-zoned properties, the City could add clarifying language to the TOC Program Guidelines 
79 In Los Angeles, site- or project-specific provisions can be established by ordinance as part of a lot’s zoning; these specific 
provisions are known as Q Conditions (Qualified Classifications) and T Conditions (Tentative Zone Classifications). T Con-
ditions represent City Council requirements for public improvements imposed as a result of zone changes, while Q Condi-
tions represent property use restrictions that ensure compatibility with the zoning of surrounding properties. Developers 
must “clear” any entitlement conditions for zone change requirements to be satisfied.
Construction site in downtown LA
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that would allow for incentives to apply when industrially-zoned properties receive a zone 
change converting the site to mixed-use or residential zoning, while preserving the general 
prohibition on use of TOC Program incentives in the event of a zone change. This would allow 
for application of bonuses specifically in instances where the site did not contain any housing 
units before. In turn, that would maximize the capacity to add housing units, including deed-re-
stricted affordable housing units, close to mass transit. 
With respect to ambiguity around conditional zoning, the City could revise the TOC Program 
Guidelines to clarify its position on this point. Where a condition is attached to a zone change 
that was approved prior to the enactment of the TOC Program, the City could specify that the 
satisfaction of the condition does not preclude eligibility for the program. These clarifications 
would reduce administrative burden on the City as project developers move through the 
program application process, and would err on the side of eligibility to maximize the number of 
deed-restricted affordable housing units required through the program. 
Implementation of Possible Measures to Address  
Identified Challenges
This portion of the paper has identified four possible measures that the City could take to 
address the TOC Program implementation issues discussed above:
n  Measure #1: Coordination with CRA/LA-DLA to resolve conflicts between the limitations of 
the redevelopment plans CRA/LA-DLA administers and the terms of the TOC Program;
n  Measure #2: Adoption of a one-year pilot program in Tiers 3 and 4, limited to sites that do 
not abut residential properties, that would, in exchange for an increased deed-restricted 
affordable housing component and an obligation to provide reduced-price transit passes 
for 3 years, allow projects to take advantage of the TOC Program’s discretionary incentives 
on a ministerial basis and allow projects of up to 100 base units to avoid site plan review;
n  Measure #3: Modification of the TOC Program to clarify that zone changes from industrial 
to mixed-use or residential zoning will not bar a project site from taking advantage of TOC 
Program incentives; and
n  Measure #4: Clarification that, where a project site is subject to a conditional zoning 
requirement imposed before the TOC Program went into effect, the site zoning for purposes 
of calculating TOC Program incentives is the new zoning, and that clearance of the condi-
tion does not reflect a “zone change” barring application of TOC Program incentives. 
Of the various measures discussed above, some would require no change to the existing 
TOC Program ordinance, which is codified in the Los Angeles Municipal Code. Those mea-
sures could be implemented by the City either through its normal dealings with other agen-
cies or by making technical clarifications to the TOC Program Guidelines, as the City already 
did once in February 2018. Measure #1, coordination with CRA/LA-DLA, can occur without 
any changes to the structure of the TOC Program. Measure #4, clarification on conditional 
zoning, could likely be implemented through a technical change to the TOC Program Guide-
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lines. Technical changes in the past have included clarifications about the applicability of 
particular tiers to certain forms of transit (e.g., rapid bus and metro line intersections), clari-
fications about the applicability of step-backs to certain height increases, and clarifications 
regarding allowable FAR increases. A clarification on conditional zoning would be consis-
tent with the technical nature of these changes.
The other two recommendations may require additional process. The City could argue that 
Measure #3, which affects changes from industrial to mixed-use or residential zoning, is a techni-
cal change; however, past technical changes to the TOC Program Guidelines have simply resolved 
ambiguities in the Guidelines’s drafting, while this change would represent a modification of the 
existing program to eliminate a prior restriction in some cases. Similarly, Measure #2, the one-year 
pilot program, would be a departure from the current program, rather than a technical change. 
In both cases, there are two possible mechanisms for modifying the TOC Program. First, TOC 
incentives may be adjusted in individual incentive areas—meaning individual half-mile radii 
around a particular transit stop or transit stops—through a Community Plan update, Transit 
Neighborhood Plan, or Specific Plan, as provided by Ordinance No. 184745, which enacted 
the program. Alternatively, the TOC Program may be modified citywide if the City Council or 
a private citizen or group proposes a new ordinance that is approved by the voters, amend-
ing the Municipal Code to reflect these adjustments. The first option would require a separate 
process for each incentive area seeking to employ a modification; the second option would 
be more widely applicable, but would require a ballot initiative. However, if there was a desire 
to further limit or test the applicability of either the industrial exemption elimination or the 
pilot program in individual incentive areas, the City could utilize the first option to create an 
even smaller-scale adjustment to the program. Modification of the site plan review threshold 
as proposed by Measure #2 could also require amendment to the Municipal Code provisions 
applicable to site plan review.
Both options involve a public process and are not without risk: opponents of proposed 
changes could mount a political or legal challenge to bar any suggested changes to the program. 
Community Plans, Transit Neighborhood Plans, and Specific Plans are typically reviewed and 
recommended by a local Area Planning Commission and the City Planning Commission before 
being heard and adopted by the City Council. Such a process can take months, or years, and 
engagement by local stakeholders may be high depending on the particular incentive area 
in question. While the ballot initiative process could theoretically lead to wide-scale program 
changes on a shorter timeframe, it is subject to significant political risk; Measure JJJ passed with 
overwhelming support in 2017, but after multiple years of program implementation, commu-
nity groups that disfavor the TOC Program’s upzoning provisions would likely mount significant 
opposition. Even after a plan or ordinance has been adopted, it is subject to legal challenge, 
which could further delay implementation.
While some of the more ambitious TOC Program changes identified in this paper could 
carry their own implementation challenges, they are still worth investigation and consideration. 
Each proposal may assist in achieving program goals, and serve as valuable data collection tools 
to test live theories about the effects of transit-oriented development and affordable housing 
incentive programs.
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What could increased efficacy in implementation 
of TOC mean for Los Angeles, and California?
The TOC Program’s implementation to date has already made it the strongest driver of pro-
posed deed-restricted affordable housing in the City of Los Angeles’ production pipeline.80 The 
suggestions in this paper, including Measures #2 and #3, have the potential to further increase 
the efficacy of the program, which in turn would lead to additional production of deed-re-
stricted affordable housing in areas of the City nearest to mass transit. Given the City’s current 
projections, it is safe to say that making the TOC Program easier to utilize would only solidify 
its position as a major contributor—indeed, at present, the most significant contributor—to 
deed-restricted affordable housing production in the City.
It bears mentioning, though, that along with this additional deed-restricted affordable 
housing comes a significant amount of market-rate development, raising questions about neigh-
borhood character and displacement in some areas. There is a body of still-developing literature 
that examines the potential impacts of infill development on gentrification and displacement 
in major metropolitan areas.81 Although a full assessment of those issues is beyond the scope 
of this paper, sensitivity to concerns about gentrification and displacement must be paramount 
when considering expansions to measures like the TOC Program, either locally or on the state 
level. The suggestions made in this paper are designed to enhance the program’s potential to 
produce housing, including deed-restricted affordable housing, while limiting the effects of dis-
placement by conditioning streamlining provisions on increased provision of deed-restricted 
affordable housing and concentrating streamlining in areas nearest rail stations, and by elim-
inating program restrictions only when the property in question is moving from an industrial 
to a residential use. However, before making any changes, policymakers should carefully assess 
and consider the potential effect of such changes on gentrification and displacement.
To help with this assessment, policymakers and others could be doing more to collect data 
about the ways in which new transit-oriented infill development impacts existing residents in 
surrounding neighborhoods. The nature of the TOC Program allows researchers to identify spe-
cific sites and their changes in use. Policymakers could develop early and continued engage-
ment with residents near TOC Program sites once a project is proposed or approved, and collect 
information about specific attributes of new projects once they are developed. For example, 
data tracking the number and percentage of market-rate versus affordable units, demograph-
ics of residents living in market-rate and affordable units, demographics in adjacent residential 
areas, frequency of mass transit use by residents in market-rate units versus affordable units, car 
ownership among market-rate and affordable residents, and more could be collected. In sum, 
gathering data about TOC Program projects may help to further elucidate questions about gen-
trification, displacement, and infill development.
80 See City of los anGeles departMent of City planninG, Housing Progress Report—Quarterly Report: January-March 2019, supra 
note 35.
81 See, e.g., Quentin Brummett and Davin Reed, federal reserve Bank of philadelphia, The Effects of Gentrification on the Well-Being 
and Opportunity of Original Resident Adults and Children (Jul. 2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3421581; Miriam Zuk, et al., 33 JoUrnal of planninG literatUre 31, Gentrification, Displacement, and the Role of Public 
Investment (Feb. 2018), available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0mh6f3tr; Karen Chapple, et al., Developing a New 
Methodology for Assessing Potential Displacement (Apr. 26, 2017), available at https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/research/apr/past/13-
310.pdf; UC Berkeley, The Urban Displacement Project, available at https://www.urbandisplacement.org/.
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In addition to serving as a potential source of useful data, the TOC Program has a role to play 
as an example for other localities and state legislators grappling with application of transit-ori-
ented development principles to the state’s current housing shortage. The program’s implemen-
tation successes and challenges can give lawmakers a sense of the outcomes associated with 
inclusionary transit-oriented development laws. This information can also help them think criti-
cally about the best ways to iterate: assessing how laws define and designate affordable housing, 
whether and how streamlining of discretionary processes is permitted, and stakeholder expe-
riences as the program continues in effect. As legislation intended to promote transit-oriented 
development emerges on the state level year after year—first with SB 827 and now with SB 
5082—the City’s lessons learned from the TOC Program will have particular relevance.
While there is still much we do not know about the outcomes associated with the TOC 
Program, the information we have suggests a few important points lawmakers should keep in 
mind as they work to address the housing crisis.
First, the TOC Program has demonstrated that transit-oriented density incentive measures 
that mandate inclusionary housing can be successful at spurring development of deed-restricted 
affordable housing under current market conditions. As discussed above, there are still many 
questions to ask about the mechanics of programs like these. Should the required percentages 
of affordable housing be higher? What are the financial constraints (e.g. investor concerns, mate-
rial costs, etc.) that affect developers’ choices about participation in the program and the type of 
affordable housing units to produce, and how do those constraints affect a decision to increase 
affordability requirements? Do our definitions of AMI appropriately match the demographics of 
neighborhoods in which new projects are sited, to ensure neighborhood residents can afford a 
new project’s deed-restricted affordable housing units? Even so, the TOC Program has become the 
top performer in adding affordable housing units to the City’s development pipeline. And early 
data shows, at the very least, that programs like these can result in more, and more affordable, 
housing as long as current market conditions favorable to the production of housing persist. 
Second, the TOC Program can itself be designed to shed light on the impacts of streamlin-
ing approval processes. A short-term and limited pilot project designed to streamline project 
approvals in Tiers 3 and 4 in exchange for an increased affordability requirement would help 
better assess the role risk from discretionary approval processes plays in developers’ choices. But 
even if such a pilot is not introduced, the TOC Program can already serve as a source of valuable 
data about developer choice on this score. For example, assessments of the number of ministe-
rial versus discretionary incentive applications could help elucidate the point at which density 
bonus incentives outweigh concerns about delays due to discretionary processes.83 As approved 
TOC Program projects move forward, timelines for discretionary review and litigation challenges 
to discretionary projects can be tracked. This information can give lawmakers a better sense of 
how to most effectively employ streamlining efforts, if at all—rather than blindly proposing 
across-the-board streamlining, which can strip vulnerable communities of important opportu-
nities for public participation.
82 Local governmental bodies, including the Los Angeles City Council, have been highly critical of these measures, which they 
view as unreasonable attempts to strip local governments of control over their own land use processes. In Los Angeles, 
members of the City Council have even pointed to the TOC Program as evidence that state legislation is not needed. See 
Statement of Paul Koretz at Los Angeles City Council Meeting (Apr. 16, 2019) (speaking in opposition to SB 50) (“…in Los 
Angeles, we have already densified and we already have TOCs…So, there doesn’t seem to be much of a point and where we 
do something that most cities haven’t done, this legislation doesn’t acknowledge that.”).
83 For example, current City data on TOC Program implementation suggests that discretionary TOC Program applications 
outpaced by-right applications by a factor of about 2 to 1 in the first quarter of 2019. City of los anGeles departMent of City 
planninG, Housing Progress Report—Quarterly Report: January-March 2019, supra note 35, at 4.
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Finally, the TOC Program provides one possible blueprint for targeted placement of inclu-
sionary housing in places where it can provide greenhouse gas reduction benefits. The South-
ern California region accounts for over half of the state’s transit trips84, and recent data shows 
that transit riders in the region are heavily concentrated in urban areas that hold 45 percent of 
the region’s mass transit commuters, despite only holding about 17 percent of the region’s total 
population.85 Low-income riders are the most frequent users of mass transit in Southern Califor-
nia.86 This data suggests that situating affordable housing in areas well-served by mass transit 
can ensure continued transit ridership rather than the use of more carbon-intensive transpor-
tation alternatives, and underscores the importance of providing housing options near transit 
for low-income residents. Transit-oriented development measures should take into account the 
realities of mass transit ridership; a transit-oriented inclusionary housing incentive program can 
do just that by requiring that developers provide housing accessible to low-income residents 
in order to unlock a site’s full development potential. The TOC Program serves as an important 
reminder that simply increasing density near mass transit is not enough to tackle either our 
housing or our greenhouse gas reduction goals: increasing density while at the same time pro-
viding for the needs of our most vulnerable populations will better help us achieve both.
Recommendations and Conclusion 
Since coming into effect in late 2017, the TOC Program has quickly become a key driver of 
deed-restricted affordable housing production in the City of Los Angeles. However, the program 
faces some implementation challenges that potentially limit its full efficacy. Limited modifications 
to the way that the program is implemented could assist in better understanding and mitigating 
those challenges, and in promoting the production of additional affordable housing units. 
To address these possible challenges, and to take advantage of the TOC Program as a 
learning tool as state and local politicians consider the role of transit-oriented development in 
addressing California’s housing shortage and climate goals, this paper recommends:
n  Possible alterations to the TOC Program that could assist in easing program imple-
mentation challenges:
 —  Coordination with CRA/LA-DLA to resolve conflicts between the limitations of the rede-
velopment plans CRA/LA-DLA administers and the terms of the TOC Program;
 —  Adoption of a one-year pilot program in Tiers 3 and 4 that would allow projects to take 
advantage of the TOC Program’s discretionary incentives on a ministerial basis and allow 
projects of up to 100 base units to avoid site plan review in exchange for affordability 
and transit pass concessions;
 —  Modification of the TOC Program to clarify that zone changes from industrial to mixed-use or res-
idential zoning will not bar a project site from taking advantage of TOC Program incentives; and
 —  Clarification regarding conditional zoning requirements imposed before the TOC 
Program went into effect, explaining that site zoning for purposes of calculating TOC 
Program incentives is the new zoning and TOC Program incentives apply. 
84 Manville, et al., supra note 14, at 17.
85 Id. at 5-6.
86 Id. at 5.
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n  Expanded efforts to take advantage of opportunities for data collection related to 
the TOC Program. These efforts could include:
 —  Assessment of existing TOC Program data, already collected by the City, that tracks the 
number of discretionary and non-discretionary TOC Program applications;
 —  Tracking legal challenges to discretionary TOC Program projects;
 —  Assessment of Tier 3 and 4 TOC Program application data created by the implementation 
of the one-year pilot program suggested as Measure #2, if it is implemented;
 —  Collection of data to track neighborhood patterns and demographics in TOC Program 
incentive areas, including data regarding prior uses of TOC Program project sites, 
number and percentage of market-rate versus affordable housing units within individual 
TOC Program projects, neighboring uses to project sites, income levels and racial demo-
graphics of the residents of TOC Program projects and in surrounding residential areas, 
area rents over time as compared to average city-wide rent increases in the same time 
period, etc.; and
 —  Collection of data to track VMT and transit ridership associated with TOC Program proj-
ects, including information about car ownership rates in market-rate versus affordable 
housing units, frequency of mass transit use by market-rate and affordable housing resi-
dents, impacts of discounted transit pass programs on ridership by project residents, etc.
n  Careful attention to lessons learned from the TOC Program, including stakeholder expe-
riences, successes, and challenges, as other lawmakers think about crafting additional 
legislation to promote transit-oriented development. Areas for consideration include:
 —  Assessment of AMI and affordability designations, and their interplay with neighbor-
hood demographics for individual TOC Program projects;
 —  The impact of discretionary approval processes and, if relevant in the future, limited 
streamlining, on utilization of the program;
 —  Financial constraints that affect developer choice about participation in the TOC Program 
and impacts of those constraints on the production of affordable housing units; and 
 —  A critical review of required affordability percentages for the TOC Program, taking into 
consideration anti-displacement concerns and market factors.
In sum, the TOC Program’s success is notable, but does not fully resolve how transit-ori-
ented development measures can best be utilized to address California’s housing shortage. As 
lawmakers at the state and local levels continue to develop and propose solutions to improve 
housing outcomes in the state, they should both look to the TOC Program as a potential source 
of valuable data and lessons learned about inclusionary transit-oriented development incen-
tives programs, and work to further improve and build on the program.
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